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Proposals for agricultural trade reform put forward by the main protagonists remain far apart, with little 
sign of convergence. In an attempt to progress the negotiations towards a successful outcome, the 
chairman of the WTO Committee on Agriculture has proposed a compromise. The alternative proposals 
by the United States, the European Union and the WTO are analysed with the Agricultural Trade Policy 
Simulation Model, a static, multi-commodity, multi-region, partial equilibrium trade model. The 
estimated annual global welfare gains are $26 billion, $12 billion and $17 billion respectively. Least 
developed countries, as a group, gain from the US proposal but are made worse off under the WTO and 
EU proposals. Furthermore, in the best case many individual countries experience welfare losses. 
However, all countries enjoy increased export revenues and tariff revenues hold up quite well under the 
two less stringent proposals. 
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Proposals for further reform in the current ongoing negotiations on agriculture appear to be diverging rather 
than converging. At least, the proposals of the two major protagonists, the United States and the European 
Union, seem to be headed in different directions. The United States, supported by the Cairns Group of 
agricultural exporters, appears to be pressing for substantial liberalisation of agricultural trade. By contrast, 
the European Union, with support from Japan, Korea, Switzerland and Norway, is taking a more 
conservative approach. Under the programme adopted by the Special Session of the Committee on 
Agriculture, the WTO chairman, Harbinson, is required to prepare a draft of modalities for further 
commitments. Concerning the reduction in tariffs and export subsidies, the first draft in February 2003 and 
its revision in March 2003 was a compromise between the EU and the US proposals. However, the 
Harbinson proposal emphasized and described the special needs of developing countries in more detail. At 
this stage (May 2003), these countries proposals may be seen somewhat as ambit claims, with scope for 
convergence at a latter stage. Nonetheless, it is useful to analyse the potential impacts of the various 
proposals, particularly on third countries.  
 
Of particularly interest is the impact of negotiated outcomes on developing countries. Development issues 
have become more important within WTO negotiations in recent years following the absence of substantial 
benefits flowing to developing countries after the implementation of the Uruguay Round reforms. Indeed, 
developing country concerns may have contributed to the failure of the WTO Ministerial in Seattle in 1999. 
Recognition of their concerns was emphasised at the Doha Ministerial Meeting in November 2001, 
whereupon a work program focusing on development issues was initiated. Much of the work program 
involves technical cooperation, including assisting developing countries in formulating a negotiating 
position. This paper contributes to this objective by providing negotiators with a quantitative assessment of 
the potential impacts of the three proposals. UNCTAD￿s Agricultural Trade Policy Simulation Model 
(ATPSM), a deterministic, comparative static, partial equilibrium trade model is used to assess the potential 
impacts on developed, developing and least developed countries of the Harbinson (revised version), US and 
EU proposals, given that they are actually implemented as specified. The paper is laid out as follows. The next section describes the negotiating context and the key proposals. 
Various modelling issues and scenarios are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 describes the results. The paper 
ends in Section 5 with policy implications, limitations and conclusions.  
 
THE STATE OF PLAY AND THE PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture led to tariffication of many non-tariff barriers and agreed 
reductions of 36 per cent from bound tariff rates (with a minimum of 15 per cent on each tariff line), plus 
additional reduction commitments on domestic support (20 per cent) and export subsidies (21 per cent in 
export volumes and 36 per cent in expenditure) to be implemented over six years. Developing countries 
agreed to commitments at two thirds of these levels to be implemented over ten years. Part of the agreement 
included a built-in agenda for further negotiations.  
 
The current WTO negotiations on agriculture focus on five key issues. These are market access, domestic 
support, export subsidy, special and differential treatment for developing countries and non-trade concerns. 
 
Market Access 
WTO members have bound themselves to maximum tariffs on nearly all agricultural products. The issue 
market access is about reductions in tariffs and other issues concerning the improvement of the access to 
foreign markets. Tariffs are still significant. The average of negotiated out-of-quota bound tariff rates on 
agricultural products globally is 61 per cent and the average of applied rates is 29 per cent.1 The simple 
average of bound rates in developed countries is 51 per cent and the average of applied rates is about 48 per 
cent. Developing country applied tariffs on agricultural products average 26 per cent, but may range as high 
as 200 or even over 300 per cent. Bound rates are much higher than applied rates, averaging 63 per cent. 
Furthermore, the substantial gap between applied and bound tariffs in developing countries implies that 
negotiated reductions in bound tariffs will have little or no impact on trade flows in many instances. Finally, 
the higher tariffs tend to be at the higher stage of processing, limiting the scope for value added industries. 
Thus, there remains plenty about which to negotiate. 
 
The Uruguay Round introduced several retrograde steps. The Agreement on Agriculture led to the 
establishment of a two-tier tariff system based on import quotas (the tariff rate quota system) for 1,370 tariff 
lines. Under this system imports are taxed at the relatively low inquota rate until the quota is filled, at which 
point the higher outquota rate applies. Two-tier tariffs tend to be used by developed countries with highly 
protected agriculture to shelter their sensitive products. Norway has 232 such TRQs, but the European Union 
(87), the United States (54) and Japan (20) are well represented. 
 
The US proposal for addressing market access issues is to reduce applied tariffs according to a harmonising 
Swiss Formula by which higher tariffs are reduced more than proportionately (USDA 2002). Under this 
formula the maximum final tariff is proposed to be 25 per cent. This implies, for example, that a tariff of 100 
per cent would be reduced according to (100*25/(100+25) =) 20 per cent while an initial tariff of 10 per cent 
would be reduced to 7 per cent. Other elements of the proposal include elimination of in-quota tariffs and a 
20 per cent expansion in import quotas. This proposal has the merit of requiring substantial reform, of 
cutting the most distortionary tariffs by the largest amounts and eliminating the water in the tariff by 
focusing on applied rather than bound tariffs. However, a uniform approach based on a single harmonising 
formula has a significant drawback for developing countries, where agricultural tariffs are on average higher 
than in developed countries. Thus, developing countries would be making proportionally greater cuts. This is 
in contrast to the Uruguay Round where developing countries implemented lesser (two thirds) reductions 
over a longer implementation period. The approach doesn￿t recognise special and differentiated treatment for 
developing countries as previously agreed in the Uruguay Round. 
 
The EU proposal for market access reform is a continuation of the Uruguay Round approach, a 36 per cent 
average cut in bound tariffs with a minimum 15 per cent cut in each tariff line (EC 2002). The major 
attraction, and conversely, problem with this approach is the inherent flexibility.  
                                                      
1 These are simple averages at the four digit level of ad valorem tariff equivalents for commodities listed in table 1. 
Applied rates are set equal to bound rates if not specified.  Tariffs are averaged over 142 countries for which data are 
available. For example, a reduction in tariffs on a sensitive product from 100 to 85 per cent could be offset by reducing 
a ten per cent tariff to 4.3 per cent to give the required simple average cut of 36 per cent. The European 
Union has not suggested any increase in import quotas. 
 
The Harbinson Proposal also applies to bound tariff rates (WTO Committee on Agriculture 2003). Out-of-
quota tariffs shall be reduced by a simple average for all agriculture products subject to a minimum reduction 
per tariff line. The formula includes bands where depending on the initial tariff average and minimum 
reductions are different. Proposed reductions are higher for higher tariffs. For developed countries the 
proposed reduction is: 
 
 
where x is the initial bound tariff. For developing countries the bands are: 
 
 
Least developed countries shall not be required to undertake any reduction commitments.
2 
 
A further issue concerning market access is the special agricultural safeguard. Safeguards are contingency 
restrictions on imports taken temporarily to deal with special circumstances such as a sudden surge in 
imports. The US proposes to eliminate the existing special agricultural safeguard whereas the European 
Commission proposes to extend special safeguard instruments to facilitate the implementation of further 
tariff reductions and to meet the developing countries￿ concerns on sensitive agricultural crops (￿food 
security box￿). This shows that this issue can also be considered under special and differential treatment of 
developing countries.  
 
Domestic Support 
Support levels are still significant despite declarations of intent. For example in the OECD countries total 
agricultural production in 2000 was valued at the farm gate at $632 billion, but to encourage this production, 
producers received support of $323 billion, over $300 per capita and nearly a $1 billion a day (OECD 2002). 
The major beneficiaries of this largesse are producers in the European Union (35 per cent of OECD receipts), 
the United States (27 per cent) and Japan. A third of every dollar received by OECD producers is attributed 
to assistance. Consumers contribute about half the cost, taxpayers the remainder. 
 
Most developing countries cannot afford substantial domestic support, and such measures in developed 
countries appear to increase global production forcing down world prices. This benefits net food importers in 
developing countries at the expense of net exporters. Thus, developing countries are divided on this issue. 
 
In WTO terminology, subsidies are classified by ￿boxes￿. In agriculture there is a green, an amber 
and a blue box. Green box support must not distort trade. The blue box contains subsidies that are 
tied to production limits. Amber box support, defined by the Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS), 
are trade distorting measures and subject to reduction commitments.  
 
The US proposal for domestic support reductions is to reduce over five years the non-exempt support as 
(amber box) and production-limited (blue box) support to at most 5 per cent of the average value of 
agricultural production in the base period 1996-98.  
                                                      
2 Harbinson has since revised his draft, including four categories for developing country tariff cuts. The resulting global 
welfare gains are virtually unchanged from the initial draft. 
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≤=By some later date all non-exempt domestic support shall be eliminated. Developing countries would have 
special conditions to enable them to provide additional support to facilitate development and food security.  
 
The EU proposal involves maintaining the amber, blue and green boxes essentially unchanged and reducing 
the (amber box) Aggregate Measurement of Support by 55 per cent. This is substantially more than the 20 
per cent in the Uruguay Round. However, the green box criteria would be expanded to encompass so-called 
non-trade concerns such as rural development, the environment and animal welfare. For example, payments 
to compensate for the additional cost of meeting higher animal welfare standards would be exempt from 
reduction commitments under the proposal. This is in contrast to the US proposal whereupon the green box 
criteria would not be expanded. At present the EU￿s AMS expenditure is not a binding constraint, but may 
become so. A flexible green box allows support to be switched from the non-exempt amber to the exempt 
green box, for example by increasing direct income support. Finally, the European Union proposes 
eliminating the de minimis provision in developed countries. The European Union makes less use of this 
provision than the United States and has less to lose from relinquishing it.  
 
The Harbinson proposal on domestic support is to maintain green box support measures unchanged. Blue 
box payments shall be reduced by 50 per cent in developed and 33 per cent in developing countries. The 
amber box Aggregate Measurement of Supports shall be reduced by 60 per cent in developed and 40 per cent 
in developing countries. The de minimis level of 5 per cent shall be reduced to 2.5 per cent.  
 
Export Subsidies 
The majority of agricultural export subsidies are provided by the European Union. It is perhaps not 
surprising than that the United States proposes to eliminate export subsidies over five years whereas the 
European Union suggests a modest reduction of an average 45 per cent in expenditure. As with tariff cuts, 
averaging provides flexibility by permitting large cuts in lightly traded or lightly protected products. At 
present export subsidy expenditure in the European Union ($5.6 billion) is comfortably inside the total bound 
limit of $8.6 billion and could accommodate a reduction of 32 per cent in the total expenditure. However, 
several individual commodities are currently up against volume constraints, including beef, poultry, pigmeat, 
skim milk powder, wheat, coarse grains and rice. The EU proposes a ￿substantial￿ but unspecified cut in 
export subsidy volumes. US expenditure is around $15 million, well within the limit. 
 
The United States proposes, in addition to the elimination of export subsidies, that disciplines shall be placed 
on officially supported export credits, food aid and other forms of export support without specifying 
quantitative limits. Most of the export credits are provided by the US to their farmers. The EU proposes that 
the trade distorting elements of export credits for agricultural products should be identified and subjected to 
strict disciplines. 
 
The Harbinson Proposal involves reduction of budgetary outlays and quantities to zero in developed 
countries within 6 years. For developing countries a much longer time period is proposed. Export credits 
shall be subject to disciplines.  
 
Special and differential treatment 
This issue is about a special and differential treatment of developing countries. In order to ensure that 
developing countries benefit from the expansion of world trade the proposals contain to a different extend 
more flexibility for developing countries.  
 
The European Union proposal calls for developed countries to accept duty free all imports from least 
developing countries and 50 per cent of imports from developing countries. The European Union itself 
already meets this criterion. Among the major importers Japan would have the most difficulty meeting this 
standard as only a quarter of its imports from developing countries are duty free. Furthermore, the EU 
proposal calls for developing countries to be permitted reduced commitments if this is necessary for them to 
meet food security and other multifunctional objectives.  
 
A further element adding to the complexity is the existence of preferential trade arrangements. Many 
developing countries, particularly those that were former colonies of current EU members, have preferential 
access to particular developed country markets. The superseded L￿me Convention between the European 
Union and the ACP countries is one well-known example. A general reduction in tariffs erodes these preferences, and countries holding such preferences may not see it 
in their interests to press for further tariff reductions.  
 
The US proposal involves no concrete suggestion concerning special and differential treatment. The US has 
is open to consider the desirability of modifying the agreed terms and conditions regarding exports from 
developing countries and providing exception provisions to meet emergency situations.  
 
The Harbinson Proposal involves special and differential treatment on every above mentioning issue. In 
addition to that, developed countries should provide duty- and quota-free access to their markets for all 
imports from least developed countries. Furthermore, the declaration of strategic products for which 
developing countries do not have to reduce tariffs is proposed.  
 
Non-trade concerns 
The agriculture negotiations provide scope for governments to pursue ￿non-trade￿ concerns such as the 
environment, rural development, labour standard and food security. However, not all countries are ready to 
negotiate these ￿non-trade￿ issues. The US does not mention this issue at all and favours a narrow round 
excluding these issues.  
 
The European Commission proposes that measures that are aimed at achieving certain societal goals such as 
the protection of the environment, traditional landscapes, rural development and animal welfare should be 
accommodated in the agreement on Agriculture. The Harbinson Proposal acknowledges non-trade concerns 
such as structural adjustments and animal welfare. Payments should be time limited.  
 
These issues cannot be modelled with the partial equilibrium model that is used to assess the economic 
effects of the three proposals. Thus, this analysis focuses on tariffs, domestic support and export 
subsidies. 
 
MODELLING AGRICULTURAL REFORM 
 
UNCTAD￿s Agricultural Trade Policy Simulation Model (APTSM) is used to estimate the potential impacts 
of the EU and US proposals, assuming they were to be implemented as specified.
3 ATPSM is able to 
estimate the economic effects of changes in within-quota, applied and out-quota tariffs, import quotas, export 
subsidies and domestic support on production, consumption, prices, trade flows, trade revenues, quota rents, 
producer and consumer surplus and welfare.  
 
The Uruguay Round reforms raised several modelling issues. Quotas on imports and export subsidies 
generate quotas rents of an estimated $10 billion and the need to assess the magnitude of the rents and their 
allocation.
4 It is assumed here that all the rent generated by the EU and US sugar policies is initially allocated 
to producers in exporting countries according to the distribution of trade.
5 Rents on sugar are estimated to be 
worth an estimated $790 million, of which $658 million goes to developing and least developed countries. 
Global rents forgone equate with rents receivable. That is, it is assumed that none of the rent is dissipated 
through rent seeking activities or inefficient means of quota administration. Rents are diminished as out-of-
quota bound tariffs are reduced but producers are assumed not to respond to changes in rents. 
 
A further simplifying assumption is that quotas are filled, either explicitly or through administrative 
constraints. This implies that in the model the applied tariff or out-of-quota tariffs, rather than the inquota 
tariff, drives the domestic prices. This further implies that changes in inquota tariffs do not have price and 
quantity effects, as these instruments are not binding. (They do, however, change the distribution of rents.) 
                                                      
3 ATPSM is a static, partial equilibrium global agricultural trade model with two way trade flows. An operational 
version of the model, associated database and documentation are available free of charge from UNCTAD 
(http://192.168.202.134/tab). 
4 This estimate assumes import quotas are filled. 
5 In a previous application of the model, reported in Vanzetti and Sharma (2002), it was assumed that the rent from all 
products went to producers, although this assumption is difficult to justify. The allocation of rents affects the 
distribution of gains from liberalisation. Here it is assumed that rents from products other than sugar are captured by 
importing countries. A second difficult modelling issue concerns the decoupling of domestic support, that is, the production 
effects of changes in support. This is a complex issue concerning the method of administration, perceptions 
of risk, the wealth effects of direct payments and the likelihood of changes in government policies. In 
addition, there are potential problems of double counting in that if border support is removed, reducing 
domestic prices, there may be no role for domestic support. The approach taken here is to assume that most 
of the domestic support is decoupled or is conflated with border support.
6 Thus the additional effects of 
removing domestic support are minimal in most cases. This assumption may bias downwards the benefits 
from liberalisation. 
 
A final observation relates to limitations modelling preferential access. Data on bilateral tariffs are not 
included in the database, although bilateral trade flows are available. Thus, it is not possible to liberalise on a 
bilateral basis and directly capture the effects of preference erosion as MFN rates are brought down closer to 
preferential rates held by many developing and all least developed countries. However, much of the effect of 
diminishing preferences is captured by the depletion of quota rents allocated initially to exporters. The model 
structure does not allow for trade diversion from changes in rents, but where the quotas are filled this effect 
will be minimal, at least for small changes in prices. 
 
Country and commodity coverage 
The present version of the model covers 160 individual countries plus one region, the European Union, 
which includes 15 countries (see appendix). Those countries not covered are mostly small island economies. 
Countries designated here as ￿developed￿ are defined by the World Bank as high income countries with per 
capita GNP in excess of $9266 (World Bank 2001). A third group is the 49 least developed countries.  
 
There are 36 commodities in the ATPSM data set. This includes many tropical commodities of interest to 
developing countries, although many of these have relatively little trade by comparison with some of the 
temperate products. Included commodities comprise meat, diary products, cereals, sugar, edible oils, 
vegetables, fruits, beverages, tobacco and cotton (see appendix).  
 
Data 
Volume data are from 2000 and are compiled from FAO supply utilisation accounts
7. The year 2000 
represents the base year for the model. The price data are also from FAO. Parameters on elasticities and 
feedshares are from FAO’s World Food Model. These are based on a trawling of the literature and are not 
econometrically estimated specifically for the model. Some of the elasticities were modified by the authors 
where this was necessary.. Inquota tariffs, outquota tariffs and global quotas, notified to the WTO, are 
obtained from the AMAD database where available and aggregated to the ATPSM commodity level.
8 Export 
subsidy data are notified to the WTO. Bilateral trade flow data relate to 1995 and are from UNCTAD￿s 
Comtrade database. These are used to allocate global quotas to individual countries. The UNCTAD TRAINS 
database is the source of information on applied tariffs.  
 
An indicator of the degree of distortion is the revenue raised or government expenditure outlaid on each 
commodity. These are a combination of the rate of support plus annual flows and are shown in table 1. It is 
apparent that most of the global protection in agriculture is on temperate products, particularly beef, wheat, 
maize, dairy products, vegetables oils and oilseeds. According to the ATPSM database, tariff revenues and 
rents for the products in the model amount to around $45 billion, with export subsidies and production 
distorting domestic support accounting for an additional $13 billion. Among the products that can be grown 
in tropical regions tobacco, sugar and poultry attract substantial protection. These products can also be grown 
in temperate regions or are close substitutes. There is relatively little tariff revenue raised on tropical 
products such as beverages (except chocolate) and cotton. For the products listed in table 1, tariff revenues 
amount to 17 per cent of import costs. 
 
The European Union and Japan raise the largest amounts of agricultural tariff revenue (over $4 billion each) 
but several other countries account for over $1 billion annually. These are Mexico, Korea, United States, 
United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Turkey. 
                                                      
6 See de Gorter (1999) for a discussion of the methodological issues involved in measuring domestic support. 
7 See FAOSTAT at http://www.fao.org  
8 AMAD database http://www.amad.org  Indeed 50 countries gather in excess of $100 million annually in agricultural tariff revenues. This illustrates 
the scope for global reform rather than focusing on the European Union, the United States and Japan. 
However, tariff revenue makes a significant contribution to government finances in some countries and this 
source would need to be replaced if revenues fall following liberalisation. 
 
The major commodities attracting export subsidies are wheat, beef, dairy products and sugar. Of the $7 
billion attributed to commodities in the database, $5.4 billion is paid by the European Union, with the United 
States at $600 million responsible for much of the remainder.  
 
The European Union ($2.3 billion) and Japan ($1.9 billion) also provide most of the domestic support that is 
considered in the ATPSM database to be production distorting. Once again the United States accounts for 
most of the remainder. Tobacco leaf, cotton, fresh milk and beef account for the largest slices of domestic 
support. 





















        
Bovine meat  3360  1335  688  604 
Sheepmeat 241  10  24  589 
Pigmeat 615  284  68  66 
Poultry 2183  169  12  165 
Milk, fresh  87  0  692  2 
Milk, conc.  1093  504  1  419 
Butter 534  413  0  169 
Cheese 1057  668  2  360 
Wheat 1882  2242  234  2315 
Rice 705  138  912  955 
Barley 439  0  226  583 
Maize 2652  96  326  2120 
Sorghum 74  0  10  17 
Pulses 338  0  73  1 
Tomatoes 184  0  73  35 
Roots & tubers  103  0  77  0 
Apples 1119  0  18  15 
Citrus fruits  537  0  265  15 
Bananas 639  0  117  390 
Other tropical fruits  251  0  0  0 
Sugar 1850  719  120  789 
Coffee green   576  0  13  3 
Coffee roasted  20  0  0  0 
Coffee extracts  7  0  0  0 
Cocoa beans  61  0  0  0 
Cocoa powder  44  0  0  0 
Cocoa butter  48  0  0  0 
Chocolate 1314  0  0  108 
Tea 357  0  0  0 
Tobacco leaves  2173  0  1698  20 
Cigars 3684  0  0  0 
Cigarettes 27  0  0  0 
Other mfr tobacco  666  0  0  0 
Oilseeds 2634  34  234  188 
Cotton linters  288  0  536  29 
Vegetable oils  2894  439  0  1 
Total 34736  7051  6419  9956 
Source: Derived from ATPSM database. Finally, over 70 per cent of the global quota rents of $10 billion are generated within developed countries. Of 
the total rents $2.2 billion is assumed to find its way to developing country exporters. Quota rents on sugar 
are important in that the bulk of the rent accrues to developing countries. Mauritius, India and Fiji and 
Zimbabwe are the major beneficiaries. China is assumed to retain all the sugar quota rents generated through 
its recent accession to the WTO, as its import quota (1,945 kt) far exceeds its imports (647 kt). 
 
In the absence of import quotas, tariff liberalisation leads to significant transfers between taxpayers, 
consumers and producers largely within one country. Where quota rents are generated, liberalisation may 
involve transfers between countries over and above the terms of trade effects.  
 
Several modelling assumptions are important to note. First, ATPSM allows two way trade. This requires an 
additional equation to specify either exports of imports. In this version of the model the change in exports is 
in proportion to the initial ratio of exports to production. If fifty per cent of production is exported in the 
initial database, then fifty per cent of any additional production will be exported. This implies the percentage 
change in exports equals the percentage change in production. Imports are determined so as to clear the 
market, that is, supply plus imports equals demand plus exports. 
 
As noted earlier, where producers receive rents they do not respond by changing quantities produced. This 
implies for example that changes in inquota tariffs change only quota rents, not quantities, prices or global 
welfare. The shifting of quota rents is a zero sum game. 
 
The model does not have a specific time dimension. The general interpretation is that the economic effects 
are of a medium-term nature, with the impacts taking three to five years to work through. 
 
Scenarios 
Three simulations are undertaken to illustrate the potential impacts of the US, Harbinson and EU proposals. 
The proposals comprise many elements. Not all elements can be captured within ATPSM. For example the 
EU proposal comprises flexibility for tariff reductions so long as the average is 36 per cent. It is not possible 
to predict a priori which tariffs are reduced by less and which by more than 36 per cent. Another example is 
that the Harbinson proposal comprises strategic products to which a minimal cut applies. Therefore, the three 
simulations that capture important ￿ but not all ￿ elements of the three proposals are not exact simulations of 
the proposals.  
 
Table 2. Alternative liberalisation scenarios. 
 
Number Label  Description 
    
1  Ambitious   A reduction in applied out-quota tariffs according to the formula 
t1=(t0*25)/(t0+25), elimination of inquota tariffs, a 20 per cent 
expansion of import quotas, elimination of domestic support and export 
subsidies in all countries and all commodities.  
    
2  Conservative  A reduction in bound out-quota tariffs of 36 per cent, a 55 per cent 
reduction in domestic support and 45 per cent reduction of export 
subsidy equivalent in developed countries with two thirds of these cuts 
in developing countries. No reductions in least developed countries. 
    
3  Compromise  A reduction in bound out-quota tariffs of 60 per cent where the initial 
tariff is higher than 90 per cent, 50 (initial tariff between 15 and 90), 40 
(initial tariff smaller than 15), a 80 per cent reduction of export 
subsidies, a 60 per cent reduction of domestic support in developed 
countries. In developing countries: a 40 per cent reduction where the 
initial tariff are higher than 120 per cent, 35 (initial tariff between 60 
and 120), 35 (initial tariff between 20 and 60), 25 (initial tariff smaller 
than 20), a 70 per cent reduction of export subsidies, a 20 per cent 
reduction of domestic support. A 20 per cent expansion of import 
quotas in developed and developing countries. No changes in least 
developed countries. The ambitious scenario is relatively straightforward. The US proposal emphasises tariff cuts from applied 
rather than bound rates and with a Swiss formula coefficient of 25 per cent.  
 
The conservative scenario is more problematic as the EU proposal is specified less definitively. First, 
specified reductions in bound rates apply to all commodities. Countries are assumed not to have flexibility to 
make lesser reductions in support to politically sensitive commodities, even though the EU proposal specifies 
this. In the conservative scenario, within-quota tariffs are only reduced if the out-quota or applied rate is cut 
to below the within-quota rate.  
 
Likewise, in modelling the conservative scenario on export subsidies, it is assumed that the rates are binding 
and that countries do not take advantage of flexibility to vary the reductions across different commodities. 
This assumption thus overstates the likely impacts from reform. However, the EU has called for ￿substantial 
￿reductions in export volumes, which may have a greater impact because many volume constraints are 
binding or close to it. Finally, while the EU proposal doesn￿t specify the special and differentiated conditions 
that apply to developing countries, they are interpreted here as similar to the Uruguay Round conditions.  
 
The compromise scenario is even more problematic. In the Harbinson proposal countries have the flexibility 
to reduce certain tariff lines by a minimum amount whenever the average equals the above stated reductions. 
Developing countries can declare some commodities as strategic products for which no reductions are 
required. The proposal includes the flexibility to reduce export subsidies in different steps. The proposed 
expansion of import quotas depends on current quotas and countries have some flexibility as an average 
expansion within certain limits is considered. Furthermore, a possibility to assure preferential schemes and 
several other special and differential treatment issues are proposed. Since it is not possible to model all the 
elements of the Harbinson proposal, the compromise simulation is only similar to the proposal capturing 




Impacts of the compromise, ambitious and conservative proposals are assessed in terms of prices, 
government and export revenue effects and national welfare. Commodity prices are examined first.  
 
Table 3. Increases in world prices from alternative scenarios. 
 
Ambitious  Compromise Conservative   
  %  % % 
      
Bovine meat  8  5  3 
Sheepmeat 11  6  4 
Pigmeat 5  3  2 
Poultry 7  3  2 
Milk, fresh  11  7  4 
Milk, conc.  19  12  7 
Butter 25  18  11 
Cheese 16  12  7 
Wheat 14  10  5 
Rice 3  2  1 
Barley 3  1  1 
Maize 5  3  2 
Sorghum 1  0  0 
Pulses 5  1  1 
Tomatoes 3  2  2 
Roots & tubers  4  1  1 
Apples 4  3  2 
Citrus fruits  2  1  1 
Bananas 2  1  1 
Other tropical fruits  4  1  1 
 Table 3. continued. 
 
Sugar 11  6  3 
Coffee green   1  1  0 
Coffee roasted  1  0  0 
Coffee extracts  7  0  0 
Cocoa beans  1  0  0 
Cocoa powder  2  1  1 
Cocoa butter  1  1  1 
Chocolate 6  5  3 
Tea 5  2  1 
Tobacco leaves  4  2  2 
Cigars 6  3  2 
Cigarettes 2  2  1 
Other mfr tobacco  14  7  5 
Oilseeds 2  1  1 
Cotton linters  2  1  1 
Vegetable oils  8  2  1 
Source: ATPSM simulations. 
 
Prices 
Comparing world prices across the commodities confirms that the more highly protected sectors dairy 
products, sheepmeat, sugar, beef and vegetable oils are most affected in all scenarios. Price changes are 
lower for tropical than temperate products. Comparing across scenarios, increases in world prices for the 
conservative simulation are about a third of the ambitious simulation, with a trade-weighted average of 2.2 
per cent compared with 6.0 per cent. The trade weighted average increase under the compromise proposal is 
4.0 per cent. Under the conservative and compromise scenarios there are many markets in which there are no 
tariff cuts because of the divergence between applied and bound rates. For example, US beef has an out-
quota tariff of 11 per cent and an applied rate of 2.6. A 36 or 60 per cent cut in the bound rate would not 
increase trade flows. Across all 4263 markets with positive tariffs in the model, actual tariffs are reduced in 
1680 under the conservative scenario and in all cases under the ambitious proposal. 
 
Government revenues 
Many developing countries are concerned that trade liberalisation will have a significant adverse impact on 
government revenues because tariff revenues make up a substantial contribution to public revenue.  
 
Eliminating tariffs altogether implies tariff revenues would be reduced to zero. Many developing countries 
would have to raise taxes on income, profits, capital gains, property, labour, consumption or through non-tax 
revenues to compensate. Broad-based taxes have the advantage of being less distortionary but they are not as 
simple to collect as tariff revenues. It may be that in small countries where most goods are imported that 
imposing, say, a sales or consumption tax would in fact operate essentially against imports. In such a case the 
essential difference is that a domestic tax would not be subject to WTO negotiations, while revenues would 
be unchanged and come from the same source. 
 
The simulation results indicate the ambitious scenario would result in an estimated 26 per cent decline in 
global revenues from agricultural trade (see table 4). Included in government revenues is the reduction in 
expenditure from the elimination of $7 billion in export subsidy expenditure and a $6 billion reduction in 
domestic support. The conservative scenario, which features moderate (36 per cent on bound rates) tariff cuts 
and smaller (45 per cent) export subsidy reductions, results in an increase in government revenues in 
developed countries and only a marginal impact on developing and least developed countries as a group. 
Among developed countries the major beneficiary is the European Union where net government revenues 
increase $6.7 billion thanks to a $3.5 billion increase in tariff revenue and a reduction of $2.4 billion in 
export subsidy expenditure. Tariff revenues rise because of the increase in trade flows. For example, tariff 
revenues on EU beef imports rise from $771 million in the base period to $1996 million even though the 
tariff has gone from 138 to 88 per cent. Imports increase from 407 kt to 1138 kt. This is driven by a 3 per 
cent fall in production and a 7 per cent increase in consumption in response to an 18 per cent fall in domestic 
prices. Similar effects occur in other countries, depending on the domestic price changes and the supply and demand 
elasticities. The revenue effects are not evenly distributed. Of the 161 countries in the model only 37 
experience a gain in government revenues. The compromise simulation results in a global government 
revenue increase of 22 per cent. There is almost no change for developing and least developed countries and 
a relatively high increase in developed countries.  
 
Table 4. Changes in government revenues relative to base from alternative scenarios. 
 
 Ambitious  Compromise  Conservative 
$m % $m % $m %
 
Developed 1237 12 7406 72 7530 73
Developing -9183 -45 -337 -2 -291 -1
Least Developed  -463 -30 -48 -3 -36 -2
World -8409 -26 7020 22 7203 22
Source: ATPSM simulations. 
 
Export revenues  
The change in export revenues is possibly the variable of most interest to negotiators. The estimated impacts 
of the two scenarios on export revenues are shown in table 5. 
 
Table 5. Increase in export revenues relative to base from alternative scenarios. 
 
 Ambitious  Compromise  Conservative 
 $ m %$ m %$ m %
 
Developed 13329 14 6995  7 4321 4
Developing 28434 30 15071 16 9596 10
Least Developed  1972 48 1106 27 773 19
World 43736 22 23172 12 14690 7
Source: ATPSM simulations. 
 
It is not surprising that export revenues rise as the increase in imports following trade liberalisation has to 
come from somewhere. The real interest is in the magnitude and distribution of the revenue gains. In 
interpreting these results, it should be remembered that an underlying assumption of the model is that the 
ratio of exports to production is maintained. This means that most of the increase in exports is likely to come 
from the largest producing countries. Whether this will bias the results in one way or the other is not clear. 
However, because of supply constraints this assumption seems not unreasonable. Looking at the table 5 the 
most obvious point for the country groups is that, as expected, trade effects are about three times higher 
under the ambitious than under the conservative scenario. Export revenue increase under the compromise 
scenario lies between the other scenarios. Initial global export revenues in the database are $197 billion. This 
figure increases by 7 per cent under the conservative scenario, 22 per cent following the ambitious and 12 
per cent following the compromise scenario. For all individual countries and individual commodities trade 
effects are positive and greater under the more ambitious proposals. Export revenue is estimated to increase 
even for the European Union (by 6 per cent under the ambitious scenario) where export subsidies are 
removed. However, export revenues in the European Union decline for several cereals, fruits, and vegetables. 
 
Welfare 
The static annual global welfare gains are estimated at around $26 billion under the ambitious scenario, $18 
billion under the compromise scenario and $12 billion under the conservative scenario. In all three cases the 
bulk of the gains accrue to developed countries because the bulk of the protection is on temperate products in 
these countries. It is noticeable that developing countries as a group gain only marginally from modest 
liberalisation and the 49 least developed countries lose as a group. However, both groups gain substantially 
more from the more ambitious liberalisation under the ambitious scenario.  
 
Developing countries share a greater proportion of the global welfare gains under the ambitious scenario 
because they are making more substantial cuts. In the compromise and the conservative scenarios developing countries make reductions to a lesser extent 
and these cuts are from bound rather than applied rates. With a 24 per cent cut as in the conservative scenario 
or an average reduction of 32.5 per cent as in the compromise scenario in bound tariffs many applied tariffs 
are unchanged. 
 
Under the conservative scenario, the gains to developing countries through improved market access and 
allocative efficiency effects are almost offset by the removal of export subsidies and world price raises. The 
least developed countries, which do not liberalise and have no efficiency gains, loose $262 million.
9 With 
greater liberalisation under the other scenarios, the benefits of domestic reform and improved market access 
begin to outweigh the negative effects of export subsidy removal.  
 
A further contribution to losses in some developing countries is the fall in quota rents received on exports of 
sugar. According to the model database, quota rents on sugar imports of $505 million and $212 million are 
generated by the European Union and the United States respectively. All of this is assumed to accrue to 
exporting country producers, $640 million in developing countries and $15 million in least developed 
countries.
10 The remainder finds its way to other developed countries such as Australia. Tariff reform lowers 
these rents. Quota rents received are reduced from $717 million to $473 million under the conservative, $376 
million under the compromise and $183 million under the ambitious scenario. These reductions are 
effectively a transfer from foreign producers to EU and US consumers. The reduction in quota rents, 
essentially a transfer from governments to consumers, is higher under the ambitious scenario than under the 
conservative scenario. 
 
Table 6. Changes in welfare relative to base from alternative scenarios ($m). 
 
  Ambitious Compromise Conservative 
 $m $m $m 
  
Developed 19394 17735 12262 
Developing 5516 336 96 
Least Developed  856 -425 -262 
World 25766 17645 12096 
Source: ATPSM simulations. 
 
Individual country winners and losers are shown in table 7. From medium liberalisation (compromise 
scenario), at least using the standard welfare measures, the main winners in absolute terms are the European 
Union ($10.4 billion), Japan ($2.4 billion) and the United States ($1.0 billion). Among the developing 
countries the greatest gains accrue to Romania ($567 million), Argentina ($374 million), Turkey ($279 
million) and Morocco ($180 million). However, there are numerous losers among developing countries. In 
fact 58 of the 161 countries in the model appear to gain from global liberalisation under the compromise 
scenario. This is because many are disadvantaged by rising world prices and loss of quota rents. The most 
notable losers are Russia ($278 million), Algeria ($153 million) and Iran ($138 million). Among the least 
developed countries the major loser is Bangladesh ($57 million). A total of $2.5 billion would need to be put 
aside to compensate all the losing countries. Under the conservative scenario, compensation for the 106 
(=161-55) losing countries needs to be around $1.9 billion. Under the ambitious scenario, however, 74 
countries are estimated to gain in terms of welfare, but for some individual countries the losses are greater. 
The cumulative losses amount to $3.0 billion.  
                                                      
9 To isolate the impact of export subsidies and domestic support alone, a separate simulation was undertaken in which 
export subsidies were reduced by 80 per cent in developed and 70 per cent in developing countries and domestic 
support by 60 / 20 per cent. Developing and least developed countries would lose $1.2 billion and $241 million 
respectively, while developed countries gain $10.5 billion. The vast bulk of these gains, $8.7 billion, accrue to the 
European Union. 
10 Except for China as stated above. Table 7. Changes in welfare relative to base for individual countries. 
 
  Ambitious Compromise Conservative   AmbitiousCompromise Conservative
 $m $m $m   $m $m $m
  
Afghanistan -16 -10 -7 Latvia  -8 -6 -4
Albania -21 -12 -8 Lebanon  11 10 11
Algeria -249 -153 -80 Lesotho  58 -11 -7
Angola 43 -23 -15 Liberia  -4 -3 -2
Argentina 780 374 214 Libya  -27 -19 -7
Armenia -25 -15 -9 Lithuania  32 21 11
Australia 1307 810 478 Macao  -6 -3 -2
Azerbaijan -24 -16 -10 Macedonia  -4 -3 0
Bahamas -4 -2 -1 Madagascar  -6 -4 -3
Bangladesh -83 -57 -37 Malawi  16 4 7
Barbados -15 -11 -8 Malaysia  399 24 24
Belarus -24 -12 -9 Maldives  -3 -2 -1
Belize -13 -11 -8 Mali  8 3 3
Benin -5 -5 -3 Malta  -10 -7 -4
Bolivia -6 -10 -6 Mauritania  -13 -8 -5
Bosnia 
Herzegovina  -33 -20 -13 Mauritius -95 -71 -51
Botswana 6 4 3 Mexico  1295 -15 -286
Brazil 283 20 6 Moldova  5 2 1
Brunei -4 -2 -1 Mongolia  -1 -1 -1
Bulgaria 56 36 26 Morocco  328 180 126
Burkina Faso  1 0 0 Mozambique 1 -11 -6
Burundi 32 -1 -1 Myanmar  345 -17 -12
Cambodia -19 -11 -7 Namibia 14 9 5
Cameroon -1 -6 -3 Nepal  -7 -4 -3
Canada 1171 771 293
Neth. 
Antilles -6 -4 -2
Cape Verde  -3 -2 -1 New Zealand 741 480 288
Central 
African Rep.  -1 -2 -1 Nicaragua 11 4 2
Chad 5 0 0 Niger  -7 -4 -3
Chile -33 -24 -12 Nigeria  39 -85 -53
China 84 51 154 Norway  829 763 529
Colombia 72 -20 -26 Pakistan  61 -63 -50
Comoros -1 -1 0 Panama  -5 -5 -3
Congo -11 -7 -4
Papua New 
G.  23 -2 -1
Congo Dem. 
Rep.  603 -17 -11 Paraguay 9 0 0
Costa Rica  26 10 8 Peru  -45 -33 -16
Croatia -3 -1 -1 Philippines  -35 -71 -25
Cuba 14 -3 -6 Poland  176 9 -41
Cyprus 188 183 141 Romania  1019 567 372
Czech Rep.  86 60 36 Russia  -523 -278 -183
Djibouti -2 -6 -3 Rwanda  -1 0 0
Dominica -1 0 0 Sao  Tome  0 0 0
Dominican 
Rep.  -5 -1 1 Saudi Arabia -230 -120 -79
Ecuador 16 5 5 Senegal  -16 -12 -7
Egypt 16 30 55 Seychelles  -1 -1 0
El Salvador  -19 -15 -10 Sierra Leone 1 -4 -2
Eritrea -7 -4 -3 Slovakia  0 2 3
 Table 7. continued. 
 
Estonia 3 2 1 Slovenia  -9 0 1
Ethiopia -23 -18 -10
Solomon 
Isla.  30 0
European 
Union 10203 10370 7222 Somalia -1 -1 0
Fiji -67 -51 -36 South  Africa 23 -28 -21
French 
Polynesia  -7 -4 -3 Sri Lanka  -28 -35 -20
Gabon -7 -5 -3 St.  Lucia  -2 -1 -1
Gambia 11 -5 -3 St.  Vincent  -1 -1 0
Georgia -30 -18 -11 Sudan -6 -8 -5
Ghana -8 -8 -4 Suriname  -3 -2 -1
Grenada -2 -1 -1 Swaziland  20 9 5
Guatemala 28 5 3 Switzerland  332 291 214
Guinea 19 -14 -9 Syria  -12 -8 -5
Guinea Bissau  -1 -1 -1 Taiwan  -137 -63 -39
Guyana -32 -25 -18 Tajikistan  -14 -9 -5
Haiti -12 -13 -8 Tanzania  -2 -8 -3
Honduras -3 -6 -3 Thailand  245 152 107
Hong Kong  -174 -87 -58 Togo  -2 -2 -1
Hungary 135 89 58
Trinidad 
Tob. -11 -10 -6
Iceland 103 104 91 Tunisia  -48 -38 -24
India 1411 22 5 Turkey  400 279 180
Indonesia 62 -98 -57
Turkmenista
n -5 -6 -3
Iran -219 -138 -84
U. A. 
Emirates  17 62 50
Iraq -113 -70 -42 Uganda  5 0 1
Israel 553 530 392 Ukraine  163 98 73
Ivory Coast  0 -11 -4 United States 1713 1021 748
Jamaica -51 -40 -27 Uruguay  87 53 32
Japan 2526 2440 1868 Uzbekistan  -12 -15 -6
Jordan -49 -28 -17 Vanuatu  0 0 0
Kazakhstan 103 73 40 Venezuela  -91 -65 -43
Kenya 15 -12 -9 Viet  Nam  39 21 21
Korea DPR  -29 -18 -11 Yemen  -103 -61 -37
Korea Rep.  226 -107 -76 Yugoslavia  34 20 20
Kuwait 54 72 52 Zambia  4 0 0
Kyrgyzstan 11 3 3 Zimbabwe  0 -21 -15
Laos 5 -2 -1 World 25766 17645 12096
Source: ATPSM simulations. 
 
Table 8. Distributional effects: Changes in consumer surplus. 
 
  Ambitious Compromise Conservative 
 $m $m $m 
  
Developed 77379 59970 33788 
Developing 4996 -16148 -9309 
Least Developed  3879 -2666 -1793 
World 86254 41156 22686 
Source: ATPSM simulations. 
 
The source for gains in developed countries is mainly consumer surplus (Table 8).  Under the compromise and the conservative scenario consumers in developing and least developed countries 
are estimated to be worse off since these country groups liberalize only to a small extend but are hit by 
increasing commodity prices. Under the ambitious scenario all groups are estimated to gain. 
 
Finally, on the subject of welfare, producers in developed countries lose from trade liberalisation but those in 
developing countries gain around $10 billion in the conservative and ambitious scenarios (table 9). Under the 
compromise scenario developing countries￿ producers gain about $17 billion. Requiring an explanation is the 
loss to producers in least developing countries under the ambitious scenario, reversing the result for the 
conservative and the compromise scenarios. This loss can be attributed mainly to a fall in production in the 
roots and tubers sector in the Congo Democratic Republic, where an initial applied tariff of 100 per cent is 
reduced to 20 per cent under the Swiss formula. The consequent 38 per cent reduction in domestic prices 
leads production to fall 11 per cent from 16 million tonnes and a decrease in producer surplus of $1.9 billion. 
Neither under the conservative nor under the compromise scenario are applied tariffs changing in this 
country and producers gain slightly from the rise in world prices.  
 
Table 9. Distributional effects: Changes in producer surplus. 
 
  Ambitious Compromise Conservative 
 $m $m $m 
  
Developed  -59222 -49’640 -29057 
Developing  9703 16’821 9696 
Least Developed  -2560 2’288 1568 
World  -52078 -30’531 -17793 
Source: ATPSM simulations. 
 
LIMITATIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
There remains considerable uncertainty whether either the EU or US proposals could be successfully 
negotiated and implemented, but assuming this was to happen, should developing countries support the 
conservative EU proposal for agricultural reform, the more ambitious US proposal or the intermediate 
Harbinson proposal? The ambitious proposal generates more static gains, $26 billion as opposed to $12 
billion or $18 billion, but also more losses to the fewer countries that do lose. In addition to higher tariff cuts 
the ambitious scenario has a greater emphasis on removing export subsidies than the conservative alternative. 
The bulk of the welfare gains from reforming export subsidies go to the European Union with some going to 
developing country exporters while importing countries are adversely affected by rising prices. Individual 
countries are affected in different ways, depending on the current trade flows and specific levels of 
protection, and need to make an individual assessment of the impacts of alternative scenarios. 
 
The results imply that developing countries must undertake some liberalisation themselves if they are to gain 
significant benefits. The advantages of improved market access in developed countries in the agriculture 
sector are relatively slight because most of the reform is in the dairy and livestock sector in which 
developing countries tend not to have a comparative advantage. Two exceptions are sugar where 
liberalisation leads to the erosion of quota rents currently accruing to many developing countries, and 
tobacco where tariffs may be seen in some countries as an instrument of social policy. 
 
The ambitious scenario has the characteristic of using applied rates as a basis and of addressing tariff peaks. 
However, negotiations have historically been based on bound rates and it is difficult to see this changing. 
Tackling the high tariffs first makes economic sense from a global point of view, but as it is developing 
countries that currently have the highest tariffs this approach contradicts the need to provide developing 
countries with special and differentiated treatment. It can be argued that negotiations should be about bound 
rates in order to acknowledge unilateral reductions of applied tariff rates. This objection, however, can be 
easily met by reducing applied rates from an historical base, such as 1990, to give credit for more recent 
reductions. Our conclusions are based on three scenarios that capture most ￿ but not all - important elements of the US, 
EU and Harbinson proposals. The Harbinson proposal in particular comprises many special and differential 
treatment elements that can for technical reasons not be captured by ATPSM. In particular no account has 
been taken of strategic products, the provision that allows countries to reduce some tariffs by only 10 per 
cent. Nonetheless, we believe the results provide a useful indicator as to the relative impacts of the 
alternative proposals.  
 
Further limitations of the analysis should be noted. The key inadequacy is the lack of knowledge of the 
distribution of quota rents. It is assumed here that only sugar rents accrue to exporters. This assumption 
probably biases upwards the welfare gains from MFN liberalisation to developing countries, as liberalisation 
erodes quota rents. If in fact quota rents on bananas currently accrues to developing countries, these will be 
reduced following trade reforms.  
 
A further assumption that overstates the benefits of liberalisation, this time in favour of developed countries, 
is the view that the higher out-quota tariffs determines domestic prices, in spite of the number of observed 
unfilled import quotas.  
 
Limitations applicable to all models of this nature should be observed. The estimated annual gains are static 
rather than dynamic, and there is no attempt to account for the one-off costs of moving labour and capital 
from declining to expanding sectors. Intersectoral and macroeconomic effects are not considered. Finally, 
data quality is an issue, especially when considering the results for a particular country or sector. 
 
In spite of these limitations, the results provide an indication of the likely nature of the impacts of alternative 
liberalisation scenarios on a country by country basis. This enables individual country negotiators to 
determine how their country may be affected by specific proposals. All of the proposals analysed here 
suggest that there are net gains, and every country can share in these if they are distributed appropriately. 
With so many individual countries adversely affected from rising prices, it would be difficult for the WTO to 
reach a consensus on reform through agricultural negotiations alone. This points to the need to broaden the 
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Country coverage in ATPSM 
 
Developed  Developing Developing  (cont.) Least developed 
Australia Albania  Latvia  Afghanistan 
Brunei Algeria  Lebanon  Angola 
Canada Argentina  Libya  Bangladesh 
China Hong Kong  Armenia  Lithuania  Benin 
China Taiwan  Azerbaijan  Macedonia  Burkina Faso 
Cyprus Bahamas  Madagascar  Burundi 
European Union  Barbados  Malawi  Central African Rep. 
French Polynesia  Belarus  Malaysia  Cambodia 
Iceland Belize  Malta  Cape  Verde 
Israel Bolivia  Mauritius  Comoros 
Japan Bosnia  Herzegovina  Mexico  Congo 
Kuwait  Botswana  Moldova  Congo Dem. Rep. 
Macao Brazil  Mongolia Djibouti 
Neth.Antilles Bulgaria  Morocco  Eritrea 
New Zealand  Cameroon  Namibia  Ethiopia 
Norway Chad  Nicaragua  Gambia 
Slovenia Chile  Nigeria  Guinea 
Switzerland China  Pakistan Guinea  Bissau 
U. A. Emirates  Colombia  Panama  Haiti 
United States  Costa Rica  Papua New Guinea  Lao PDR 
 Croatia  Paraguay  Lesotho 
 Cuba  Peru  Liberia 
 Czech  Rep.  Philippines  Maldives 
  Dominica  Poland Mali 
  Dominican Rep.  Romania Mauritania 
  Ecuador  Russia Mozambique 
  Egypt  Saudi Arabia  Myanmar 
 El  Salvador  Seychelles  Nepal 
 Estonia  Slovakia  Niger 
 Fiji  South  Africa  Rwanda 
 Gabon  Sri  Lanka  Sao  Tome 
 Georgia  St. Lucia  Senegal 
 Ghana  St. Vincent  Sierra Leone 
 Grenada  Suriname  Solomon Islands 
 Guatemala  Swaziland  Somalia 
 Guyana  Syria  Tanzania 
 Honduras  Tajikistan  Togo 
  Hungary Thailand Uganda 
 India  Trinidad  Tobago  Vanuatu 
 Indonesia  Tunisia  Yemen 
 Iran  Turkey  Zambia 
 Iraq  Turkmenistan   
 Ivory  Coast  Ukraine   
 Jamaica  Uruguay   
 Jordan  Uzbekistan   
 Kazakhstan  Venezuela   
 Kenya  Viet  Nam   
 Korea  DPR  Yugoslavia   
 Korea  Rep.  Zimbabwe   
 Kyrgyzstan    
Note: Among the 49 least developed countries, Bhutan, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Kiribati, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Samoa, Somalia, Sudan, Togo and Tuvalu are not included in the model. Commodities in ATPSM. 
 
Meat 





02212 Milk, fresh 
02222 Milk, conc.  
02300 Butter  
02400 Cheese  
Cereals 
04100 Wheat 
04400 Maize  






22100 Oil seeds 




05480 Roots, tubers 
05440 Tomatoes  
Fruit 
05700 Apples & pears 
05710 Citrus fruits 
05730 Bananas 
05790 Other tropical fruits 
Beverages 
07110 Coffee green bags 
07120 Coffee roasted 
07131 Coffee extracts 
07210 Cocoa beans 
07240 Cocoa butter 
07220 Cocoa powder 
07300 Chocolate 
07410 Tea 
Tobacco and cotton 
12100 Tobacco leaves 
12210 Cigars 
12220 Cigarettes 
12230 Other tobacco - mfr. 
26300 Cotton linters 
 
 